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In the paper, it is argued that democratization in Central and Eastern Europe involves 
important forms of differentiation of democracy, rather than merely convergence to a 
singular – liberal-democratic, constitutional - model. One way of taking up democratic 
differentiation in post-communist societies is by analysing the constitutional documents 
of the new democratic orders, and the constitutional politics leading to the foundational 
documents. In a first step, the paper analyses constitutional politics and the major 
actors involved in three countries (Hungary, Poland, and Romania), emphasising the 
symbolic conflict over perceptions of democracy and emerging dominant discourses on 
democracy in constitution-making. In this, the paper argues that the drafting processes 
and debating over constitutional forms did not only entail struggles over political power 
and institutional set-up, but also involved symbolic struggles over the meanings of 
democracy. The importance of such meanings is revealed in a second step, when the 
constitutional documents themselves are looked at. It is shown that the constitutions of 
the respective societies portray significant differences in the codification and 
hierarchization of rights and the rule of law, citizenship and identity, civic 
participation, and - to a somewhat lesser extent - distributive justice. It is argued that 
the constitutions put different emphases on a number of what will be called ethics of 
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All the former communist countries adopted new constitutions in the early 1990s or 
profoundly amended the old ones so as to change their original shape and content (as in the 
case of Hungary). It can be argued that the late 1980s constituted a ‘constitutional moment’ - 
even if not in Bruce Ackerman’s full sense of popular inclusion (see Ackerman 1992: 14-18) - 
in that a profound rupture was brought about with the pre-existing political structures, and a 
decisively new set of political norms and values was entrenched in constitutional documents. 
In this regard, the new constitutions performed at least two tasks. First of all, the new 
constitutions constituted foundational documents of the emancipated new order, and in this 
sense contained norms and values that were radically opposed to those of the immediate past, 
and, at the same time, they formed a kind of safeguard against any return to the totalitarian 
past. Second, the constitutions reconstituted national sovereignty to the post-communist 
societies after 40 years of Soviet domination (Elster 1998: 63). 
 
The general coincidence of the trajectories and the shared characteristics of the post-
communist societies resulted in a comparable constitutional outlook and perception of the role 
of the constitution in democracies amongst the (political) elites involved, regarding the role of 
rights, the rule of law, and democratic pluralism. At the same time, and this forms the main 
argument of this paper, the constitution-making trajectories and their eventual outcomes in the 
form of constitutional documents show significant variety in both the dynamics of the 
constitution-making process, and in terms of emerging understandings of constitutionalism 
and democracy. It will be argued below that such variety has become visible in the ultimate 
codification of constitutional values and democratic ethics in the constitutions. 
 
The paper will, first, briefly analyse the constitution-making process, looking at the political 
context and procedures, the main actors involved, and the perceptions of the constitution and 
its role in democracy endorsed by major actors. The paper will proceed by means of a textual 
analysis of the constitutional documents of Hungary, Poland, and Romania, following the idea 
of different democratic ethics (see Blokker 2008). Four such ethics will be distinguished. 
First, the ‘ethic of rights’. This ethic is about the priority of rights and the rule of law, and an 
identification of democracy with the liberal model of constitutional democracy in its emphasis 
on natural rights, legal procedures, and the equality of citizens before the law. A second ethic 
is the ‘ethic of identity’, based on a priority of identity as defining identity or group 
boundaries and a related understanding of the common good. This ethic of identity is invoked 
when a shared ‘thick’ identity, and its continuous preservation and flourishing, is understood 
as the main aim of a democratic polity. A third ethic is the ‘ethic of self-rule’, based on a 
priority of the idea of substantive participation. In the active, substantive conception of 
participation, popular sovereignty or democratic self-rule does not mean the transfer of 
sovereignty to an administering state, but self-rule is rather grounded in society and seen as an 
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end itself. Finally, the fourth ethic, the ‘ethic of distributive justice’, understands substantive, 
socio-economic equality as a priority in democracy. 
 
 
Constitutional Politics in Comparative Perspective 
 
Hungary 
The Hungarian constitution-making process was a relatively drawn-out process that started as 
early as 1987 (Bozóki 1992). The relatively mild form of communist regime that was 
established in Hungary in the wake of 1968 created opportunities for the emergence of 
opposition groups that operated in a kind of second public sphere. The significance of such 
groups became such that, when at the end of the 1980s the economic and financial crisis 
became untenable, the reformist elements in the communist party perceived negotiation and 
compromise with the opposition as the best solution, which ultimately took the form of 
Roundtable Talks (Ripp 2002: 3-4).1 It can be argued that the approach of both communist 
reformers and opposition converged around a form of self-limitation, i.e., the radical reform 
of the existing system from within, without a violent rupture (cf. Arato 2000). Even if the 
participating opposition had more radical ideas on democratic reform than its Polish 
counterpart (see Renwick 2006), the idea was that such radical changes could best be enacted 
within existing constitutional structures. Such a piecemeal, reformist approach meant that 
constitutional change was to be based on the gradual amendment of the communist Law XX 
of 1949, rather than a restorative return to the revolutionary tradition of 1848 and 1956, or 
even the century-long tradition of customary law or the ‘historical constitution’ (cf. Körösényi 
1999; Arato 2000). The strong emphasis on the rule of law, and the liberal and ‘transnational’ 
form of constitutionalism that became the predominant vision in Hungary in the 1990s has, 
however, been in continuous tension with a ‘counterconstitution’ that is endorsed by those 
forces that seek a return to the constitutional tradition of the Hungarian monarchy (Scheppele 
2000). 
 
In the late 1980s, however, a vision of gradual constitutional reform predominated on the 
scene of constitutional politics, in contrast to any ideas of complete revision or revolutionary 
rupture. In fact, the Hungarian ‘revolution’ consisted in a ‘constitutional revolution’2 
(Paczolay 1993a), i.e., the regime change was brought about by legal means rather than by 
means of political violence (as in the Romanian case). The Hungarian transition thus took the 
form of an incremental revision of the constitution by means of regime-opposition 
negotiations, even if the idea at that time was that of a ‘constitution for the transition’ which 
was to eventually be replaced by a fully new constitution matching the new social and 
political order (Bozóki 1992: 68). A new document could not be adopted right away, since 
according to the opposition the incumbent parliament (elected in 1985) did not enjoy the 
necessary popular legitimacy. 
 
It can therefore be argued that the most conspicuous feature of Hungarian constitutional 
politics is that it proceeded under the imaginary of a strictly legal basis, an emphasis on the 
rule of law that regarded both the procedures of the political transition itself and its ideated 
end result (a constitutional state) (Halmai 1998: 155; Scheppele 2000). The guiding model for 
                                                 
1 For the emergence of the Roundtable Talks in the Hungarian context, see Bozóki 2002. 
2 In Paczolay’s terms, ‘scrupulous attention was paid to ensure that changes were carried out within the 
constitutional and legal systems’, in other words, the changes were not only ‘legally prepared, but were also 
based on an existing Constitution and emphasis was placed upon the continuity of the legal system’ (Paczolay 
1993a: 561).  
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Hungarian constitutional change was clearly the German model, with an emphasis on 
liberalism, the Rechtsstaat, and a ‘corporatist concept of technocratic self-administration’, 
rather than on the ‘Rousseauist principle of popular sovereignty’ (Körösényi 1999: 146). 
 
In the Hungarian regime change - that lasted roughly from 1988 until 1990 - three moments of 
constitutional politics can be identified (cf. Küpper 2007).3 The first of the three moments was 
the drafting of a constitutional reform by the minister of justice and a number of legal experts 
in 1988-9 (see Tőkés 2002). The second moment regarded the formation of a National 
Roundtable comprising the communist party, the so-called opposition roundtable (comprising 
most importantly, but not only, the radically liberal Alliance of Free Democrats and the 
moderately nationalist Hungarian Democratic Forum),4 and social-corporatist auxiliaries, the 
latter often, even if not entirely accurately, seen as supporters of the communist regime (cf. 
Szikinger 2001: 410-11, fn 5). The Round Table, even if not set up to have constitutional 
prerogatives, eventually produced a constitutional amendment – Act XXXI - in late 1989. The 
third moment of constitutional politics can be identified in a number of successive 
constitutional amendements carried out by the first freely elected parliament in 1990. 
 
The first moment of constitutional politics consisted in the drafting of a new document by the 
Ministry of Justice, as asked for by the Communist party, in 1988-9. The drafting was an 
expression of the reformist intentions of the Communist part, ‘a product of the old regime’s 
enlightened legal experts’ vision of a “law-governed” post-communist state’ (Tőkés 2002: 
126), seeking through legal reform to remediate a profound lack in legitimacy, to save the 
viable parts of the old regime while discarding the non-viable ones, and to reform the 
communist system from within. This can be characterized as an attempt at ‘self-renewal’, in 
that ‘[t]he crowning achievement of the regime’s internal reform forces was the annotated text 
of a revised constitution submitted by the Ministry of Justice, first to the Politburo, then to the 
Central Committee HSWP in January-February 1989’ (Tőkés 2002: 135: fn 18). The 
objective of the revision of the constitution, which was a one-sided revision in the sense that 
no oppositional forces were involved, was to bring about two changes, i.e., a reform of state 
institutions (introducing the presidency and a Constitutional Court) and the bringing into 
conformity of Hungary’s first law with international agreements on human rights (and 
supplemented by a list of social and economic rights) (Tőkés 2002: 117, 121-2)5.  
 
The second moment of constitutional politics initiated when the parliamentary debate and 
ratification of the constitutional revision was interrupted because of the protests of extra-
parliamentary oppositional forces gathered in the Oppositional Roundtable (EKA). The 
withdrawing of the draft from parliamentary debate and the transfer of the debate to the 
National Roundtable, combining reform forces within and without the communist party, 
signified the beginning of political pluralism and of regime-opposition negotiations on the 
revision of the constitution. The National Roundtable could be seen as a kind of ‘ad hoc 
constituent assembly’ even if its mandate was not purely constitutional (Tőkés 2002: 118). 
The eventual outcome of the National Roundtable that was held from June until September 
1989, was an agreement over a ‘self-limiting’, peaceful transition grounded in legality. The 
                                                 
3 This is not to say that a ‘constitutional moment’ - in Ackerman’s sense of brief but intense widespread public 
engagement - ever occurred in Hungary. Arguably, one could add a fourth moment of constitutional politics that 
consists in the amendments in 2002 in the light of EU accession. In contrast to the Romanian case, it can, 
however, be argued that the Hungarian amendments had a rather minimal impact on the overall constitutional 
structure (cf. Albi 2005). 
4 For a sociological-genealogical analysis of the participating parties, see Bozóki and Karácsony 2002. 
5 Significantly, Tőkés characterizes the reforms submitted by the Ministry of Justice as the ‘Reform Socialist’ 
constitutional model (Tőkés 2002: 119). 
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agreement formed the basis for the so-called Act XXXI, which constituted a profound 
revision of the old, Communist constitution of 1949. The Act XXXI was anyhow for an 
important part based on the draft constitution as devised by the Ministry of Justice, making it 
hard to assess the revisions that can be contributed to the latter and those that resulted from 
the National Roundtable. In this sense, Tőkés argues that some three quarters of the draft 
constitution appeared in Act XXXI (2002: 123). 
 
Arguably the most important point of consensus among the parties deliberating in the 
Roundtable Talks was the emphasis on the rule of law and the necessary legal nature of the 
transition. Imre Poszgay, spokesman for the communist party, for instance, argued at the time 
that ‘the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party believes that the ideal form of government of 
government for Hungary at the end of the 20th century would be a government based on the 
rule of law and constitutional guarantees...’ (Bozóki 2002: 316). Gyorgy Szabad, the 
spokesman of the Opposition Roundtable, emphasised that the main aim was ‘making sure 
that democratic rights are respected’ and that the opposition was ‘trying at these talks to 
promote an agreement to be enshrined in law...’ (Bozóki 2002: 316-7). 
 
The third moment of constitutional politics took the form of a series of nine amendments in 
1990 that were the outcome of a compromise (the Antall-Tölgyessy Pact) between the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum, part of the governing coalition, and the Alliance of Free 
Democrats, the opposition, the two largest parties in the newly and freely elected Hungarian 
parliament. The amendments led, amongst others, to the complete elemination of any  
references to socialism (Paczolay 1993b: 24), thereby eliminating an important part of the old 
regime’s symbolic and ideological baggage from the constitutional text, and the introduction 
of the so-called constructive no-confidence vote and the abolition of individual parliamentary 
responsibility of ministers (Arato 2000: 210, 219). It should be noted, however, that the 
amendments were not the outcome of an all-inclusive, cross-party consensus, but were rather 
concluded between the two parties mentioned (Tőkés 2002: 130). Throughout the 1990s, 
various additional amendments were adopted (until 1997, thirteen in total), including a 
reformulation of the conditions for referenda and civic initiatives (see, for an overview, 
Küpper 2007: 112; Rácz 1998). Also, attempts were undertaken to adopt an entirely new 
constitutional text, but the latter ultimately failed to be adopted (Arato 2000; Küpper 2007). 
Enduring problems of legitimacy and a contention over the role of national identity, history 
and constitutional traditions have led to the increasing prominence of challenges to the rights-
based constitution since the second half of the 1990s, and currently the Hungarian political 
scene seems a stand-off between political forces endorsing a liberal-democratic, legalist 
political culture on the one hand, and those that adhere to a nationalist political culture 




The protracted contention between regime and opposition in Poland - with as most significant 
historical moment the rise of Solidarnosc and the subsequent imposition of martial law in 
1981 - ultimately led to the regime change in 1989. The inescapability of reform was one of 
the principal factors that ultimately led to the famous Roundtable Talks between reformist 
elements in the communist party and the opposition forces, mostly gathered in Solidarnosc. 
Poland, as one of the most open and least repressive communist regimes in the East-Central 
European region, had allowed for a substantial opposition to emerge, which also meant that a 
forceful counter-hegemonic discourse could emerge during the 1980s. At the moment of 
regime change at the end of the 1980s, this counter-hegemonic discourse comprised two 
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major alternative visions that had emerged from opposition to communism, and that competed 
over the establishment of the dominant vision of the post-communist political and economic 
order that was to retrieve the long-lost independence of Poland: on the one hand, a 
collectivistic and nationalist vision, and often related emphasis on Christianity as a crucial 
element of Polish identity, and on the other, a civic-liberal understanding with a strong 
emphasis on the rule of law (cf. Ekiert & Kubik 1999). 
 
The Polish process of constitution-making started with a number of far-reaching amendments 
that initially culminated in the adoption of the interim Little Constitution in 1992. Polish 
constitutional politics proved to be of a protracted, evolutionary kind, continuing until the 
latter part of the 1990s, and combined in its gradual approach older and modified, with 
completely new elements, only to adopt a formally new constitution in 1997 (Spiewak 1997). 
The Polish experience with constitution-making can be characterized as a process that was to 
a significant extent based on a symbolic conflict over fundamental, substantive values, in 
particular along the lines of the duality in oppositional discourse sketched above, but 
ultimately ended in a fairly widely endorsed compromise over the new constitution. Particular 
in its later phase the constitutional debate was characterized by a highly conflictive dialogue 
between various political and societal forces over the nature and substance of the constitution, 
and, in this, the nature of democracy itself. In general, it can be argued that the civic-liberal 
forces endorsed a prospective and Europeanist outlook of a democratic polity whereas the 
patriotic-religious side argued for a polity grounded in Polish tradition, for the explicit 
constitutional codification of Polish national identity, in particular its religious component, 
and against the ‘negotiated revolution’ of 1989 and its principle of radical self-limitation.  
 
Arguably, three moments of constitutional politics can be identified in the Polish constitution-
making process. Constitutional politics essentially started with the Roundtable Talks, held in 
February-April 1989, even if these talks were of a primarily political rather than a 
constitutional nature, as the Roundtable did not constitute a constituent assembly (comparable 
to the subsequent Hungarian Roundtable) (Kurczewski 2003: 165; Wyrzykowski 1999: 7). At 
the same time, the Roundtable agreement did lead to a fundamental revision of the electoral 
law and the constitution in the ‘April Amendments’ (Brzezinski 1998: 83-7), adopted by the 
still communist-dominated parliament, that consisted in an alteration of the electoral system 
by introducing limited political pluralism, a basic restoration of the separation of powers (e.g., 
creating a relatively independent judiciary), and the (re-)introduction of the institutions of the 
Presidency and the Senate (Cole 1998; Jasiewicz 2000). The reformed electoral law provided 
the framework for the subsequent ‘non-competitive’ (Lewis 1990) or ‘limited’ (Davies 2001) 
parliamentary elections in which the Solidarity-opposition participated and achieved an 
unexpected victory. The Roundtable Talks were held between representatives of the 
communist party and communist-dominated state institutions, representatives of the 
independent trade union Solidarity (that had been outlawed in 1981), and representatives of 
the pro-communist trade union OPZZ, while church officials were present as observers 
(Osiatynski 1996: 33-7). In contrast to the later Romanian experience with a Roundtable (that 
was significantly held after the regime breakdown), the Polish ‘original’ Roundtable Talks of 
early 1989 can be seen as a more authentic form of deliberation and negotiation between the 
incumbent communist party and the opposition embodied by Solidarity, even if it did not 
enjoy full legitimacy. The Roundtable’s results were a series of amendments of the 
constitution that paved the way for limited political pluralism. 
 
In December 1989, the newly elected parliament, which included Solidarity, adopted a 
number of additional, rather radical amendments to the 1952 Communist constitution (the 
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‘December Amendments’, which had already been agreed upon during the Roundtable Talks 
(see Brzezinski 1998; Winczorek 1999: 17), while also instituting a Constitutional Committee 
that was to draft a veritable new constitution. The amendments cancelled the pre-amble of the 
1952 Communist constitution, its first two chapters on the communist political and socio-
economic system, and reference to the Party’s leading role, allegiance to the Soviet Union, 
and collective property (Cole 1998). The new article 1 established the attachment to the rule 
of law of the new Polish Republic, closely following the German understanding of the 
Rechtsstaat (Brzezinski 1998: 88). The parliament that had been elected in the first free 
elections in Poland since the advent of communism was only partially democratic, in the 
sense that the Roundtable Talks had led to a compromise that stipulated that 65 % of the seats 
in the Sejm (the Lower House) was to go to the communist party, while the remaining 35 % 
was open to oppositional forces as well. The newly instituted Senate (the Upper House) was 
entirely open to the opposition. The compromise was clearly based on the communist party’s 
reluctance to allow for full political pluralism, and was to institute a limited pluralism 
compatible with reform socialism. 
 
The second moment of constitutional politics consisted of the establishment of a 
constitutional committee and the parliament’s adoption of the so-called Little Constitution.6 
The latter was to counter the constitutional crisis that had resulted from challenges between 
the government and the President over the latter’s political prerogatives, but was regarded as 
provisional and partial (Winczorek 1999: 18). The Little Constitution focussed exclusively on 
issues of the separation of political powers, and did not entail any codification of civic rights, 
leaving de facto the chapter on rights and liberties of the 1952 Communist constitution in 
force (Brzezinski 1998: 105; cf. Cole 1998). The new interim constitution clarified the 
relations between the institutions of the presidency and the parliament, requalifying the status 
of the Sejm as the dominant legislative power,7 resulting in a compromise between 
presidential and parliamentary democratic systems (Brzezinski 1998: 98-9). The actual 
elaboration of a new constitutional draft had been equally subject to conflict and 
postponement, not in the last place because of the parallelly operating constitutional 
committees of the Sejm and the Senate. The Constitutional Act of April 1992 was to resolve 
this by creating the legal framework for the adoption of a new constitution, to be enacted by a 
single constitutional committee of the combined National Assembly. Importantly, the act 
allowed for constitutional initiative also outside of the constitutional committee, including 
social forces, and, in an attempt to enhance the legitimacy of the final constitution, stipulated 
a national referendum to adopt the new constitution (Winczorek 1999: 18-20). 
 
The third moment of the protracted constitution-making process, which comprised a number 
of years (1994-97), and which a number of contemporary commentators thought to only end 
in the early 2000s (Kurczewski 2003), included the whole period of drafting of the new 
constitution from 1992 onwards, and culminated in the final adoption of a new text in 1997. 
The Constitutional Commission formally responsible for the draft constitution consisted of 
the members of parliament in the 1993-1997 period. This parliament was the outcome of the 
1993 general elections (which were based on new, highly exclusionary electoral rules) that 
had brought victory to the post-communist coalition, and included only a small minority of 
                                                 
6 Its official name was ‘Constitutional Act on Mutual Relations between the Legislative and Executive 
Institutions of the Republic of Poland, and on Local Self-Government’. 
7 As stated in the news account of the East European Constitutional Review (1992: 12), ‘the Sejm (the lower 
house of parliament) ceases to be the supreme office of state and becomes, jointly with the Senate, merely the 
national legislature’. 
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centre-right parties (most importantly, the Freedom Union)8 while excluding Solidarity and 
rightist and religious forces (comprising one-third of the electorate). Therefore, the legitimacy 
of the new parliament in its role as constitution-making body was questioned. In reaction, the 
extra-parliamentary opposition submitted the so-called ‘citizen’s draft’, and demanded to put 
this draft, together with the constitutional committee’s draft, to the referendal vote. 
 
The constitutional debate, that came to a climax in early 1997, focused for an important part 
on the preamble, and on its definition (or lack thereof) of Polish democracy. The initial 
proposal for a preamble by the Constitutional Commission did not contain a reference to the 
Polish nation (understood as a historical community with distinct traditions, value patterns, 
and a collective identity based on Catholicism), which added a further substantive reason for a 
strong critique by the extra-parliamentary right-wing parties and the church. Other points of 
contention were the lack of an invocatio Dei, and the lack of a clear grounding of the rule of 
law in natural law (cf. Brier 2006; Halas 2005; Zubrzycki 2001). The latter constitutes a 
particularly interesting point of contention, in that the claim was made that only in this way a 
true respect for human and minority rights was possible (Halas 2005: 56). It was argued that 
the Commission’s draft was ultimately an ideological and political draft, elaborated by 
political parties that did not represent the entire Polish nation. The general critique was then 
that ‘the preamble was constructed in such a way that it could be valid in any state of the 
world and in any value system, even in the most relativist one’ (as argued by one participant 
in the constitutional debate, Brier 2006: 126-7). 
 
The Constitutional Commission countered such arguments by referring to the ideologically 
pluralist nature of the Polish population, and therefore the impossibility of constructing 
anything other than a neutral state (this had been a reason to not include a preamble in the 
constitutional draft in 1993, see Halas 2005: 55). It was argued that the critique on the draft 
by right-wing forces added up to the endorsement of a ‘confessional state’, detrimental to the 
establishment of any kind of modern and neutral Rechtsstaat (Zubrzycki 2001: 646).  
 
The National Assembly – the Sejm and the Senate – passed the Constitution in April 1997, 
while a national referendum adopted the final text in May, although with a rather low voter 
participation (43 %). The 1997 constitution was a clear compromise (Wyrzykowski calls it 
indeed a ‘constitutional compromise’, 1999) between secularised, civic-liberal forces (as 
gathered, for instance, in the Freedom Union) and socialist forces (e.g., the post-communist 
Alliance of the Democratic Left). It also constituted a compromise in that elements of critique 
by the right and the church were incorporated in the text, especially the preamble, even if the 
extra-parliamentary right-wing parties continued to criticise the text. The 1997 constitution 
can be seen as a hybrid, dialectical interpretation of democracy, in that it refers both to a 
rights-based and to an identity-based understanding of the political community (I will 
elaborate on this in the textual analysis below). 
 
Romania 
The Romanian regime change had a character decisively different from the ‘negotiated 
revolutions’ in Hungary and Poland (cf. Arato 2000: 159). Whereas in the latter countries 
reforms had been introduced since at least the 1980s, and, even if with difficulty, a dialogue 
had emerged between the communist party and oppositional forces (the most conspicuous 
case is obviously the role of Solidarnosc), in Romania virtually all forms of political or 
economic reformism had been suppressed by the Ceauşescu-regime, while hardly any 
                                                 
8 In all, the parliamentary ‘constitutional coalition’ consisted of the Democratic Left Alliance, the Polish Peasant 
Party, the Labour Union, and the Freedom Union (cf. Winczorek 1999; Roszkowski and Kofman 2006). 
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oppositional forces had managed to organize in the decade that preceded the collapse of the 
communist regime. The ostensibly profound rupture – in terms of a violent revolutionary 
change - with the preceding communist regime (which culminated in the execution of the 
Ceauşescus on 25 December 1989), consisted in reality in deep continuity, not only in terms 
of the continuity of holders of political power (i.e., a political coalition dominated by the ex-
communist nomenklatura), but also in terms of political outlook, and, as I will elaborate 
below, the perception of the political community. It can be convincingly argued that the 
specific type of regime change had a significant impact on the development of the 
constitutional state and democratic political form that developed in its wake (see Gabanyi 
1998: 205; Elster 1998). 
 
As argued by Iulia Huiu, three moments of constitutional politics can be identified in the post-
communist history of Romania, the first moment in December 1989 and the beginning of 
1990 with the effective regime change, the second moment with the debate on and adoption of 
the new constitution in 1991, and the third with the revision of the constitution in 2003 (Huiu 
2003). The political transformation started in December 1989 with popular uprisings in, 
among others, the cities of Timişoara and Bucharest. When the Ceauşescu-regime fell, the 
moment of vacuum in political power was quickly seized by the self-declared transitional 
political council of the National Salvation Front (NSF9). This council absorbed the political 
sovereignty of the preceding regime, and instituted the so-called Provisional Council of 
National Unity (PCNU), which some observers have understood as a Romanian version of 
roundtable talks (see Gabanyi 1998; Tudor & Gavrilescu 2002). The PCNU was to produce 
an electoral law as well as a political party statute. Its make-up was, however, hardly 
conducive to the dialogical and compromise-based logic of a political roundtable, not in the 
least because it was dominated by the post-communist forces that had taken over political 
power. The president of both the NSF and the PCNU was Ion Iliescu, a figure who would 
dominate the first decade of Romanian political transformation, in particular in the position of 
president of Romania, while membership of the Council consisted for almost for 50 % of NSF 
members (112 out of 255 members) (Tudor & Gavrilescu 2002: 98). The PCNU even went 
beyond its official mandate as a preparatory institution, i.e., establishing the procedural 
conditions under which the form and substance of the future polity was to be chosen, by 
anticipating the codification of a number of aspects related to the future political form in the 
Electoral Law of March 1990 (Gabanyi 1998: 213). The ‘acts of a constitutional nature’ 
adopted early on by the NSF and later by the PCNU regarded foundational issues, which were 
later included in the constitution, such as a republican form of government (in contrast to calls 
for a restorative return to the monarchic constitution of 1923), political pluralism, and the 
inviolability of human (individual) rights (Muraru and Tănăsescu 2005: 99). Not all of these 
foundational principles were, however, of an uncontested nature. 
 
In this, the first constitutional moment was dominated by the post-communist NSF and their 
particular vision of an ‘original democracy’ (based on the idea of a national consensus, see 
Pasti 1997), in the elaboration of the political, procedural framework that was to inform the 
drafting and adoption of the new constitution. The post-communist NSF defended above all a 
vision of the national unitary state, which was informed by a ‘discourse of limited change’ 
(Blokker 2004), and built on traditions of Romanian particularism as well as the national 
communism of the second half of the communist period. This nationalist discourse served in a 
                                                 
9 The name in itself seems to indicate a predilection for the values of the Romanian majority and national unity 
that were conspicuous in Romanian national communism. The name National Salvation Front was first attributed 
to an oppositional movement, associated with the six prominent party members that in March 1989 wrote an 
open, critical letter to Ceauşescu, the so-called ‘letter of six’. 
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strategic sense to defeat the voices of change that emerged from the side of the Hungarian 
minority (which had played an important role in the anti-communist protests) as well as from 
that of the democratic opposition in formation, both of which endorsed a Western-oriented, 
civic and rights-based discourse. 
 
The second moment of constitutional politics began with the election of the constituent 
assembly. In May 1990, the constituent assembly was elected (as a proto-parliament), one of 
whose main tasks it was to draft a new constitution. The constituent assembly was equally 
dominated by members of the NSF, i.e., of the 521 members of the assembly, 355 were part 
of the NSF. The Constitutional Commission that was responsible for the writing up of the 
draft text consisted of 28 members, of which 13 belonged to the NSF, while Antonie 
Iorgovan, the head of the drafting team, was formally independent but had a communist past 
and was considered close to the NSF. The debate over the new constitution consisted of a 
political cycle involving: the publication of the draft constitution, a debate and vote over the 
constitution’s articles, the re-editing of the constitution by the commission on the basis of the 
vote, the receipt and selection of amendments by the commission, the debate and vote over 
the amendments, and a final vote over the full constitution (Preda 2002: 398). In spite of this 
elaborate process, the constitution as drafted by the constitutional commission remained 
largely unchanged. Of the 1019 amendments only 68 were taken into consideration for 
debate, and in general the constitutional debate can be seen as having involved the affirmation 
of the majority’s constitutional view, rather than a genuine pluralist dialogue (Lungu 2002; 
Preda 2002: 399-400). 
 
In the constitutional debate held between February and December 1990, the post-communist 
majority showed a clear predilection towards what I have called an ‘ethic of identity’ or what 
Lungu has identified as a form of ‘constitutional nationalism’ (Lungu 2002). The role of the 
constitution was interpreted as primarily expressing a recovered, homogeneous Romanian 
identity, and the fact that the Romanian state ‘belongs to a single ethnie, and that it is a 
national and unitary state’ (as stated by a participant to the talks, cited in Preda 2002: 401). 
The symbolical dimension of the constitution received explicit and ample attention in the 
debate, in particular with regard to its role as vehicle of Romanian traditions and culture, in 
this sense taking the overhand over the functional dimension of explicating rights and 
institutional prerogatives and limitations. While the constitution embodied the demands of the 
1989 revolution, these demands were particularly interpreted as the right to national self-
determination of the Romanian majority. 
 
This also became clear in debates between the political majority and representatives of ethnic 
minorities, in particular the Hungarian minority. The post-communist party as well as a party 
from the radical right dismissed any proposal for a multi-ethnic state. The constitution was 
interpreted as the expression of the traditions and sovereignty of a homogeneous cultural 
entity, and its principal source and subject the Romanian people. One of the main issues of 
contestation was, therefore, the formulation of the first article of the constitution, in which the 
unity, national, and indivisible nature of the Romanian state is codified. Any expression of a 
more multi-cultural and divided form of sovereignty was dismissed by the political parties 
belonging to the Romanian majority. As expressed by Antonie Iorgovan: ‘... now when we are 
fighting to create a state of law and when we are strongly promoting the principle of equal 
rights, to argue that the minorities are still a problem is a shameless exageration’ (cited in: 
Lungu 2002: 404).  
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The final constitutional text was adopted by the parliament on 21 November 1991, and 
popularly approved of by means of a national referendum on 8 December of the same year. 
The adoption of the new constitution meant the definite and entire abrogation of the 
communist constitution of 1965 (Muraru and Tănăsescu 2005: 105), and its formulation had 
been inspired, among others, by the French Constitution of 1958 (Gabanyi 1998: 215-6). The 
main principles codified in the text included the institutionalization of a constitutional, 
democratic and social state, a republican form of government and a bicameral parliamentary 
system, and political pluralism (cf. Muraru and Tănăsescu 2005; Verheijen 1995). 
 
The domination of constitutional politics by NSF did not mean, therefore, that standard 
references to human rights and constitutionalism were not present in the final text (as will be 
shown in the textual analysis below), but rather that these principles alluding to 
internationally diffused standards were in tension with, and sometimes clearly re-interpreted 
through, a constitutional-nationalist lens. As argued by the then president Ion Iliescu in a 
radio address to the Romanian people prior to the national referendum on the constitution: 
’Establishing the republic as the form of government, the Constitution proclaims the 
sovereignty of the people and sanctions the popular legislative initiative. It affirms the 
supremacy of the law, and the fact that no one can be outside the law. It sanctions political 
pluralism, private property, and a market economy. It proclaims and guarantees – in an 
institutionalised framework – fundamental rights in accordance with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’. A few sentences before, he had, however, stated ‘... 
Romania’s Constituton represents the fundamental charter for the existence of the Romanian 
state, it is Romania’s identity document. This Constitution contains principles and provisions 
at the level of the most advanced constitutions in the world. It defines the essence of the 
Romanian state as a state of law, a democratic, social, national state, a sovereign and 
independent and a unitary and indivisible state’ (emphasis added; BBC, 11/12/1991). 
 
The constitutional text that had been devised mostly according to the preferences of the post-
communists of the NSF was not amended until the early 2000s. Even if the anti-communist, 
pro-democratic coalition – gathered in the Democratic Convention - gained in strength during 
the 1990s, and in November 1996 won the parliamentary and presidential elections, the 1991 
constitution was not revised until 2003. By then, the political situation had changed 
considerably in that the contention between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian 
minority had for a good part resided, and explicit forms of nationalism with it. The political 
agreement on revising the constitution was widely shared by the political parties, including 
both the post-communist-turned-social-democrats and the centre-right parties,10 and was 
deemed necessary on two general grounds. 
 
On the one hand, the adoption of the acquis communautaire and imminent membership of the 
European Union called for modifications of the 1991 constitution (in particular in terms of the 
relation between national, European, and international law, as well as regarding the status of 
minorities) (Duculescu and Adam 2006). On the other hand, the 1991 constitution was 
deemed to contain a number of ambiguities that needed to be resolved in order to clarify 
relations between political institutions, strenghten the rule of law, and accelerate the 
legislative and judicial process, as well as strengthen the institutional and constitutional 
guarantees of fundamental liberties and rights (cf. Duculescu and Adam 2006; Huiu 2003; 
Muraru and Tănăsescu 2005). To this end, a constitutional commission with the task to draft 
                                                 
10 The only party not endorsing constitutional revision was the right-wing extremist party Partidul România 
Mare (PRM). 
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amendments for a revised constitution was established in 2002 on the basis of a political 
agreement between the parties in parliament.  
 
The commission contained a significant part of members of the primary governing party at the 
time, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), i.e., the former post-communist FSN,11 but the 
revision debate, public discussion and process of constitutional politics as a whole can be seen 
as significantly more consensus-based and participatory than the process of constitution-
making in 1991. One significant example of this is the development of a Constitutional 
Forum, in order to include various components of civil society and of singular citizens into 
the constitutional debate, on initiative of the parliament and in collaboration with the civil 
association Asociaţiei Pro Democraţia.12 
 
The constitutional revision entailed in a number of important respects a shift away from the 
relatively nationalist and centralistic outlook of the 1991 Constitution, towards a more 
pronounced emphasis on the ethic of rights, in particular visible in a clear reference to the 
separation of powers (art. 1) and the emphasis on the equality of citizens, access of citizens to 
public institutions, the right to a fair legal process, as well as the right to the free access to 
culture and the right of minorities to participate in local government (Muraru and Tănăsescu 
2005: 109). 
 
In the debate, there was a relatively clear-cut consensus among the participants for the need 
for amendment, and thus the importance of constitutional politics as a means of updating and 
revising the constitution. Adrian Nastase, the prime minister and member of the PSD, argued, 
for instance, ‘The Romanian Constitution, approved by national referendum on 8 December 
1991, was the expression of the victory of the Romanian revolution of 1989… No constitution 
is eternal and therefore unchangeable… The revision of the  constitution and of legislation in 
general has become a practice of nearly all democratic states today, corresponding to the 
exigencies of the Rechtsstaat. The supremacy of the constitutional norms in the frame of the 
legal system of a state imposes the necessity that this corresponds with historical-social 
evolution, in themselves consolidating the capacity to innovate and modernize a society’. 
Only the PRM did not share this consensus and argued from the perspective of 
foundationalism: ‘The constitution represents a juridical bible of a country. And, in this 
quality, it is the principal guarantee of democracy, but not by itself, but through respect and 
stability’ (member for the PRM in the constitutional debate). The speaker went on: ‘Our 
problem is not to revise the constitution, but to respect it’.13 
 
 
A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Texts 
 
In the wake of the revolutions of 1989, the processes of ‘constitution-making’ or 
‘constitution-amending’ were of primary importance for the establishment of an imaginary 
and political break with the past. Communist regimes had been only formally constitutional in 
that constitutions had been adopted, but these were reduced to a democratic façade for 
voluntaristic political practices and an abuse of rights. At most, these first laws served the 
purpose of a statement of intent of the party, and a summary of ideal-typical behaviour for the 
‘citizens’. The constitutionalization of politics had therefore been one of the most important 
                                                 
11 10 of the 25 members of the commission were PSD members (Huiu 2003: 7, fn 5). 
12 See for the final amendments proposed by the Forumul Constituţional, ‘Forumul Constituţional. Raport final’, 
available at: http://www.forumconstitutional.ro/raport_final.pdf. 
13 Dezbateri Parlamentare 18 June 2003, at: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.home?idl=1. 
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demands of the dissidents in the regime change. The actual implementation of the constitution 
was deemed essential for the irreversable democratisation of the political system. In this, the 
emphasis was clearly on the protective nature of constitutions and the function of the 
constitution as a limiting, negative one, in its arranging for – by means of a ‘set of principles, 
manners, and institutional arrangements’ - the limitation of government or majority rule in 
order to prevent the state from subjecting individuals (Sajo 1999: xiv). The constitution in this 
view stipulates the inviolability of a set of rights enjoyed by individuals as well as the idea of 
separation of powers as fundamental principles that prevent political power from being 
abused and turned against society in general or minorities in particular. 
 
In this sense, some have argued that the revolutions of 1989 were predominantly ‘rights 
revolutions’ that (re-)installed the rule of law (see Priban and Sadurski 2006: 202). This post-
1989 emphasis on the institutionalisation of a constitutional state, grounded in an ethic of 
rights, was further visible in a diffused attention for institutional devices that prevent the 
influence of democratic politics on constitutions, in particular in the form of constitutional 
courts. It can be argued that the ‘rights revolutions’ occurred in a historical moment in which 
‘rights foundationalism’, i.e., the idea that constitutions enshrine a set of universal and non-
negotiable rights, and the juridification of constitutions, i.e., the idea that constitutions should 
not be the object of everyday politics, were on the rise (cf. Bellamy and Castiglione 1997).  
 
But even if the legal, rights-based dimension of a constitution undeniably forms its primary 
raison d’être, other dimensions of equal importance should not be lost sight of. These include 
a participatory dimension (pertaining to the enabling components of constitutions), and a 
symbolic, integrative dimension invoking a substantive or symbolic rationality of 
constitutionalism. In partial contrast to the idea of ‘rights revolutions’, some observers have 
indeed argued that the distinguishing factors of constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe 
are not so much their emphasis on a liberal, rights-based vision of constitutionalism, but 
rather that they consist of a 'substantive' type of constitutions. This substantive aspect is seen 
as including teleological aims in terms of economic and social rights (Preuss 1995), a strong 
'souverainist' dimension (a strong safeguard of the sovereignty of the new state) (Albi 2005), 
and/or forms of 'constitutional nationalism' or 'communitarian constitutionalism' in which the 
safeguard of cultural identity plays a primary role (Hayden 1992; Preuss 1995). 
 
While in general these elements can be found to important extents in some (if not all) of the 
constitutions - distinguishing the region as a whole - it can at the same time be argued that the 
constitutional documents in the region show significant variety in terms of their interpretation 
of the rule of law, their codification of collective identities (demos - ethnos) and the relation 
to external and internal heterogeneity, the codification of forms of participation and local 
government, and of social and economic rights. I argue below that  the constitutional 
documents of three countries (Hungary, Poland, and Romania) reveal the codification of 




Despite the ‘negotiated revolution’ in Hungary in the spirit of self-limitation and ‘new 
evolutionism’ (cf. Arato 2000: 173; Tőkés 2002),14 and the legal continuity in the process of 
                                                 
14 The Hungarian Constitutional Court articulated the change within rather than of the system as a ‘revolution 
under the rule of law’, which entailed so much as the creation of a new political order by means of extensive 
amendment and reinterpretation of a previously non-respected legal order (cf. Dupre 2003: 30). Thus, the Court 
argued that ‘one cannot create a rule of law state with methods other than the rule of law’ (Arato 2000: 183). 
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‘constitution-making through amendments’ or ‘permanent constitution-making’ (Halmai 
1998: 189), it can be argued that the current Hungarian constitution (which ultimately consists 
of a profoundly revised version of the 1949 constitution) has developed into one of the more 
liberal and civic documents - with a mostly prospective rather than historical outlook (Priban 
2007) - that has been adopted in the ECE-region. As argued above, the constitutional text that 
emerged in the early 1990s reflects the dominant political culture of that time, which 
perceived democracy as a regime grounded in an ethic of rights, and the constitution as an 
expression of a prospective, legalist, and Europeanist perception of the Hungarian democratic 
polity. Elements of a more explicit symbolic, integrative dimension and references to the past 
were mostly removed in the early 1990s, while no other references came in their place. 
 
On the one hand, the ‘constitutional revolution’ in Hungary, grounded in a tradition of legal 
revolutions, can be understood in a formalistic sense as portraying a fundamental continuity 
with the proceding legal order, but, on the other, in a political-sociological sense, the 
profound changes enacted through amendments from 1989 onwards ultimately added up to a 
clear break with the past (Paczolay 1993b: 28-29). In the words of Istvan Szikinger: 
Hungary has a formally old, substantially new constitution which was the result of the 
amendments passed by the outgoing communist parliament following the decisions made at the 
Roundtable Talks. The 1989 amendment (Act No. XXXI) changed not only an overwhelming 
majority of positive rules in the basic law, but also its spirit. The party-state regime enshrined in 
the 1949 communist Constitution was thus transformed into one structured along the principles of 
division of power and the liberal values of human rights and public power (Szikinger 2001: 407). 
 
A political-sociological interpretation of the legal changes in post-communist East-Central 
Europe is indeed more compatible with the argument that is made here, which holds that the 
changes of 1989 constituted a fundamentally different political regime which cannot be 
disconnected from the emergence of a set of fundamentally different political cultures, in 
themselves based on political ethics that were not formally part of the preceding communist 
regime. Of primary importance in terms of constitutional change is evidently the ethic of 
rights that refers to the equality of individuals before the law, a set of fundamental rights, and 
proceduralism or the rule of law. In the Hungarian process of constitution-making, the old 
constitution was given a completely new meaning by discarding of the references to socialist 
values and prioritizing rights in an absolute sense (cf. Paczolay 1993b: 24). This completely 
changed the substantive value and status of the constitution. 
 
In this respect, the Hungarian constitutional text contains a number of very clear statements 
regarding the rule of law and the constitutionalist nature of the new, post-communist 
Hungarian state (cf. Dupré 2003: 28-38). The preamble articulates the originally transitory 
nature of the document: 
In order to facilitate a peaceful political transition to a constitutional state, establish a multi-party 
system, parliamentary democracy and a social market economy, the Parliament of the Republic of 
Hungary hereby establishes the following text as the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, 
until the country's new Constitution is adopted (emphasis added). 
 
The first, and therefore prominent, articles of the constitution indeed ground the rule of law in 
a constitutional state and popular sovereignty: 
The Republic of Hungary is an independent and democratic constitutional state. (article 2 (1)) 
The Constitution not only refers to the conventional foundation of the democratic state on the 
recognition, and respect and protection for fundamental rights (art. 8 (1)), and the equality of 
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all individuals before the law (art. 57), but also explicitly argues against any legal limitation 
of fundamental rights (art. 8 (2)): 
In the Republic of Hungary the law contains rules on fundamental rights and obligations, but must 
not impose any limitations on the essential contents and meaning of fundamental rights. (article 8 
(2)) 
 
Thus, in the light of the democratic ethics that underpin conceptions of democracy, the 
Hungarian constitution clearly invokes and gives priority to the ethic of rights, as the main 
objective of the state lies in its negative function of guaranteeing the protection of individuals’ 
subjective rights. This is so, even if the fundamental personal, and civil and political rights 
chapter has remained in its original position at the end of the constitution (i.e., chapter XII, as 
in the original 1949 constitution), rather than having been put in a more prominent position at 
the beginning, as in most constitutions (Dupré 2003: 33). 
 
The emphasis on the rule of law is further underpinned by the institution of the Constitutional 
Court (chapter IV), which was established during the first constitutional moment in 1989 and 
constituted one of the constitutional novelties in the post-communist constitution. The 
Constitutional Court has an exceptionally wide mandate (Körösényi 1999: 164), and clearly 
has interpreted its role as the active safeguarding of constitutional principles and the 
Hungarian Rechtsstaat.  
 
A further, relatively original, feature of the Hungarian constitution is the fundamental 
democratic guarantee that political power belongs to no one (except for to the people at large), 
and is grounded as such in the rule of law. The first chapter of the constitution, regarding 
general provisions, can be said to convey an anti-totalitarian spirit in the original reference to 
the avoidance of any domination of the political system by a singular political force: 
The parties may not exercise public power directly.  Accordingly, no party may control or direct 
any State organ.  In order to ensure the effective separation of the parties from State power, the 
law determines the social and public offices that cannot be filled by any member or officer of any 
party. (article 3 (3)) 
 
The emphasis in the Hungarian constitution on the ethic of rights is further confirmed by an 
almost total absence of any reference to the ethic of identity. Indeed, the Hungarian 
constitution can be distinguished from other post-communist constitutions (for instance, from 
the Polish and Romanian constitutions) by the absence of any invocation of the nation, 
national history, or cultural traditions (either in the preamble or the substantial constitutional 
text itself). In this sense, the spirit of the constitution is mostly prospective and based on a 
notion of civic or state nation (Priban 2007; cf. Majtényi 2005). As article 68 (1) with regard 
to the balance between the Hungarian nation and national minorities states: 
The national and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary participate in the sovereign 
power of the people: they represent a constituent part of the State. (article 68 (1)) 
 
At the same time, though, the constitution does invoke a (singular) reference to the cultural 
nation made up exclusively of ethnic Hungarians, thus invoking the ethic of identity, in the 
article related to the status of Hungarians living outside of the Hungarian state (a similar 
article can be found in the Polish and Romanian constitutions): 
The Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside 
its borders and shall promote and foster their relations with Hungary. (article 6 (3)) 
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This invocation has been understood as invoking a logic of citizenship as based on ius 
sanguinis and therefore contradicting the overall civic nature of the Hungarian constitution. It 
can be related to the political culture of political forces on the centre-right that see democracy 
as based on an ethic of identity, which understands the Hungarian nation as a cultural nation. 
In particular in concomitance with the so-called Status Law of 2002, this article has invoked 
the negative reactions of both the Romanian and Slovakian governments as extending 
Hungarian jurisdiction beyond its formal borders (Priban 2007: 87-8). And while the 
constitution does not formally stipulate the criteria of Hungarian citizenship, the statutory law 
that arranges for citizenship (1993) is based on the principle of ius sanguinis as enshrined in 
the ethnic logic of article 6 (3) (Priban 2007: 87).  
 
In terms of the ethic of participation, the constitution is, on the one hand, relatively restrictive 
regarding civic participation in the change of constitutional rules, while, on the other hand, it 
provides for a number of instruments regarding direct democracy. The latter set of rules was 
constitutionalised in 1997 through a constitutional amendment and can be regarded as at least 
partially the outcome of initiatives ultimately related to the democratization movement of the 
1980s (Priban and Sadurski 2006: 218). The Hungarian constitution stipulates the 
conventional rights of political participation (passive and active political rights) (articles 70 (1 
and 4), while residing non-citizens can participate in local elections and referenda (art. 70:3): 
All adult Hungarian citizens residing in the territory of the Republic of Hungary have the right to 
be elected and the right to vote in Parliamentary elections, local government elections or minority 
self-government elections, provided that they are present in the country on the day of the election 
or referendum, and furthermore to participate in national or local referenda or popular initiatives. 
(article 70 (1)) 
 
In terms of participation in constitutional amendment, the Hungarian constitution is relatively 
restrictive. The rules for amendment are laid down in article 24(3), which applies the ‘two-
thirds’ rule to constitutional amendment, meaning that only two thirds of the parliament can 
introduce a constitutional change. The constitutional right to the holding of referenda on 
citizens’ initiative does not apply to the amendment of constitutional rules. Even though the 
constitution does not explicate this, this became clear in a ruling of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court (Arato 2000: 154; Deszo and Bragyova 2001: 75-6). 
 
Regarding non-constitutional, legislative issues, the constitution contains a detailed 
elaboration of the conditions for holding national referenda in articles 28B-E. Referenda can 
be initiated by popular initiative (a minimum of 100,000 voting citizens for facultative 
referenda, 200,000 for compulsory ones) as well as by the president or members of 
parliament. Regarding local issues and local government, Hungarian citizens have the right to 
participate through local elections and local referenda (art. 44(1)). 
 
The Hungarian Constitution further invokes a social, distributive dimension. Beginning with 
its preamble, it states that the transition to a constitutional state is also about the ‘conversion 
to a socially alert market economy’. In itself, such an invocation can be interpreted, following 
Wojchiech Sadurski’s argument, as a ‘constitutional anchor for social welfare programmes’, 
even in the absence of widely constitutionally codified socio-economic rights (Sadurski 2002: 
7). The Hungarian Constitution seems to acknowledge both public and private initiative in the 
economy in its reference to the fact that ‘Hungary has a market economy in which public and 
private property are to receive equal consideration and protection under the law’ (art. 9). In 
terms of catalogues of socio-economic rights, it can be argued that the Hungarian 
Constitutions contains a relatively modest catalogue (cf. Sadurski 2002: 16). It contains a 
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reference to the ‘right to social security’ in article 70/E, to the right ‘to the highest possible 
level of physical and mental health’, which shall be implemented ‘through arrangements for 
labour safety, with health institutions and medical care’ in article 70/D (1-2), while there is no 
reference to free health care, to ‘free education’ up to primary level education in article 70/F, 
to the ‘right to work’ in article 70/B(1), and the ‘right to equal pay for equal work’ in article 
70/B(2). With regard to the latter, it can be argued that in terms of socio-economic rights 
related to working conditions, the Hungarian Constitution contains a ‘very broad list’ 
(Sadurski 2002: 15). 
 
Poland 
The ‘belated’ adoption of the Polish Constitution in 1997, the constitution that replaced the 
provisional, so-called Little Constitution of 1992, provides an extraordinary example of the 
codification of (at least) two quite clearly defined political cultures or systems of democratic 
meaning-giving in one constitutional document. In particular the preamble to the Constitution 
can be seen as expressing two different interpretations of democracy and nationhood, 
entailing both the ‘ethic of rights’ and the ‘ethic of identity’, and has as such been a relatively 
frequent object of interpretations of the symbolic side of the Polish constitution (see Brier 
2006; Halas 2005; Priban 2007; Zubrzycki 2001). 
 
The Polish Constitution of 1997 reflects two distinct and relative coherent visions of 
democracy and the constitutional order (Zubrzycki 2001: 636). One perception of democracy 
that has been clearly codified in the Constitution is based on a civic, secular, and Europeanist 
vision of the Polish constitutional order, while the contrasting vision is relatively more 
complex in that it is based on an ethno-cultural and nationalist vision, and thus includes ideas 
of a historically rooted and culturally homogeneous Polish nation while simultaneously 
invoking a strongly Catholic definition of the Polish nation. 
 
In particular, the preamble reveals a struggle or ‘cultural war’ between the two main visions 
of democracy in Poland. This becomes clear in the hybrid or dual nature of many of the 
provisions of the preamble. The first sentence seems to unequivocally refer to an identitarian 
understanding of a Polish cultural community that is connected by its past and future: 
Having regard for the existence and future of our Homeland…  
 
The following words seem to confirm an ethic of identity by means of the formulation ‘We, 
the Polish Nation’. This confirmation is, however, immediately amended, and actually 
connected by a hyphen, by the statement ‘all citizens of the Republic’. In this, the second part 
clearly invokes a political, rights-based, rather than a pre-political, culturally-based 
understanding of the individual members of the Polish democratic polity. Such formulations 
of compromise many a time reflect concessions made by the constitution-making majority to 
the extra-parliamentary forces of the centre-right.  
 
The dual nature of the preamble consists therefore in its rights-based and value-based nature, 
or, in other words, in the attempt to define the political community simultaneously in civic, 
rights-based and universal terms, and in terms of a particular Polish community with strong 
roots in the past (including references to the struggle for survival of the nation at the times of 
absence of the Polish state) as well as in Christianity (cf. Zubrzycki 2001). Whereas the first 
can be detected in the invocation of civic values and a secular understanding of the Polish 
polity, the second, value-based ‘spirit’ comes to the fore in the articulation of a cultural, 
historical, and religious understanding. In some instances, the constitution clearly reflects a 
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compromise between secular and cultural-nationalist ideas, as in the following sentence that 
was suggested by Tadeusz Mazowiecki: 
Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As well as those 
not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources… 
 
Similar statements of a dual nature can be found throughout the preamble: 
for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values… 
Recognizing our responsibility before God or our own consciences… 
 
A number of statements have a clear invocation of a past-oriented and cross-generational 
attachment to the Polish nation: 
Poland, Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence achieved at 
great sacrifice… 
Recalling the best traditions of the First and the Second Republic… 
Obliged to bequeath to future generations all that is valuable from our over one thousand years' 
heritage… 
 
Other statements are clearly evoking a singular ethic of civic equality and of universal rights: 
Equal in rights and obligations towards the common good… 
Aware of the need for cooperation with all countries for the good of the Human Family… 
Mindful of the bitter experiences of the times when fundamental freedoms and human rights were 
violated in our Homeland… 
Desiring to guarantee the rights of the citizens for all time, and to ensure diligence and efficiency 
in the work of public bodies, 
Hereby establish this Constitution of the Republic of Poland as the basic law for the State, based 
on respect for freedom and justice, cooperation between the public powers, social dialogue as well 
as on the principle of subsidiarity in the strengthening the powers of citizens and their 
communities. We call upon all those who will apply this Constitution for the good of the Third 
Republic to do so paying respect to the inherent dignity of the person, his or her right to freedom, 
the obligation of solidarity with others, and respect for these principles as the unshakeable 
foundation of the Republic of Poland. 
 
The two democratic discourses that emerge from the preamble are in many instances clearly 
in tension, and invoke different ethics of democracy in their propositions of what the finalité 
of the democratic community should be. While an ethno-cultural definition of the nation does 
not necessarily need to go against a civic, liberal understanding of democracy (as in a ‘liberal 
nationalist’ perception, see Auer 2004), i.e., when both religious and universal, civic values 
are acknowledged, the ethno-cultural definition is sometimes formulated in a mutually 
exclusive sense, thereby obstructing an inclusive reading of the nation: 
Bound in community with our compatriots dispersed throughout the world… 
 
The exclusivist reading of a national identity is further reinforced by the above-mentioned 
references to ‘ancestors’, their ‘great sacrifice’, and ‘future generations’ that invoke a closed 
community with common ethno-cultural characteristics that are stable over time (cf. 
Zubrzycki 2001). Such exclusivist renderings of an ethno-cultural understanding of the Polish 
nation are further legally emphasized in some of the articles of the actual constitutional text. 
Thus, article 3 argues against forms of divided sovereignty: 
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The Republic of Poland shall be a unitary State (Article 3). 
 
In this, it a priori excludes any form of local, territorial autonomy of a federal type. And, in a 
similar way as the Hungarian and Romanian constitutions, the Polish constitution refers to the 
necessity of safeguarding Polish cultural heritage also in the extra-national context: 
The Republic of Poland shall provide assistance to Poles living abroad to maintain their links with 
the national cultural heritage (Article 6 (2)). 
 
The communitarian, identity-based dimension of the constitutional text is clearly in some 
tension with the predominant rights-based nature of the 1997 constitution. The latter becomes 
evident from the relatively few articles in the main text that invoke a symbolic, identity-based 
dimension (art. 3, 6(2), 34, and 82) and the strong grounding of the Polish republic in law. 
The rights-based nature becomes clear from article 2 of Chapter I, entitled ‘The Republic’, 
which clearly founds the Polish republic as a ‘democratic state ruled by law’ (as confirmed in 
the articles 31(1,2), 37, and 38), while article 7 grounds the functioning of institutions in law, 
and article 8 establishes the constitution as the supreme law. Article 10 explicitly stipulates 
the division of power between the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, while article 
25 arranges for the state-church relations: the state ‘shall be impartial in matters of personal 
conviction, whether religious or philosophical, or in relation to outlooks on life, and shall 
ensure their freedom of expression with public life.’  
 
The articles 30 and 31 provide the basis for the ultimate sources of the constitutional law, 
even if article 31(3) seems formulated in less strong words than in its equivalent in the 
Hungarian text (article 8(2): ‘the law... must not impose any limitations on the essential 
contents and meaning of fundamental rights’). It should be noted that the reference to human 
dignity is based on a compromise with those (religious) social forces that sought to include a 
reference to natural law in the Polish constitution, and by some has taken to mean an 
invocation of an extra-legal ‘jus-naturalistic conception of human rights and liberties’ (see 
Sadurski 2003: 1): 
The inherent and inalienable dignity of the person shall constitute a source of freedoms and rights 
of persons and citizens. It shall be inviolable. The respect and protection thereof shall be the 
obligation of public authorities (Article 30). 
Any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by 
statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or public 
order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of 
other persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of freedoms and rights (Article 31(3)). 
 
The Polish constitution invokes an ethic of self-rule or participation already at the beginning, 
in article 4(2): ‘The Nation shall exercise such power directly or through their representatives’ 
(emphasis added), as well as in the preamble, which argues that the basic law of the state is 
grounded in ‘the principle of subsidiarity in the strengthening the powers of citizens and their 
communities’. The constitution of 1997 codifies the citizens’ right to direct participation 
through referenda in constitutional matters, national referenda regarding ordinary legislation, 
and referenda on the local level (cf. Gebethner 2001). In contrast to the Hungarian 
constitution (and the Constitutional Court ruling on the issue), the Polish constitution grants 
the possibility of a popular referendum on constitutional amendments, even if such a 
referendum is not obligatory, can only be initiated by the parliament or the president, and only 
in case of an amendment dealing with particular chapters: 
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If a bill to amend the Constitution relates to the provisions Chapters I, II or XII, the subjects 
specified in Paragraph (1) above may require, within 45 days of the adoption of the bill by the 
Senate, the holding of a confirmatory referendum. (Article 235 (6)). 
 
In addition, citizens have the possibility to appeal to the Constitutional Court in case they 
presume that their constitutional rights and freedoms have been infringed by statutory law or 
decrees (art. 79; cf. Arato 2000: 225). In the case of ordinary legislation, article 125(1) 
stipulates that ‘[a] nationwide referendum may be held in respect of matters of particular 
importance to the State’, but only on initiative of the parliament or the president (art. 125(2)). 
A citizens’ initiative is allowed by a law on referenda of 1995, but is subject to the approval 
of the Sejm (Gebethner 2001: 134). It is a political decision what matters are considered of 
‘particular importance to the State’. In addition, and rather significantly from the point of 
view of participation, Polish citizens have the right to legislative initiative according to article 
118(2): 
The right to introduce legislation shall also belong to a group of at least 100,000 citizens having 
the right to vote in elections to the House of Representatives (Sejm). The procedure in such matter 
shall be specified by statute. 
 
In terms of local participation, the constitution gives local communities the possibility to 
engage in referenda: ‘Members of a self-governing community may decide, by means of a 
referendum, matters concerning their community, including the dismissal of an organ of local 
self-government established by direct election. The principles of and procedures for 
conducting a local referendum shall be specified by statute’ (art. 170). In the light of the 
importance of the notions of subsidiarity and local self-government in the Polish context, 
partially the result of the influence of dissidence on the shape of the post-communist regime 
(see Poplawska 2002; Sadurski and Priban 2006), it can be argued that direct participation on 
the local level is a relatively important dimension in the definition of democracy of the Polish 
constitution. At the same time, its should be acknowledged that the references to self-rule and 
direct democracy mostly have an ‘auxiliary’ function to representative democracy, rather than 
a free-standing significance (cf. Gebethner 2001: 138). 
 
With regard to the ethic of distributive justice, the Polish Constitution invokes in article 20 the 
notion of a ‘social market economy’: 
A social market economy, based on the freedom of economic activity, private ownership, and 
solidarity, dialogue and cooperation between social partners, shall be the basis of the economic 
system of the Republic of Poland. 
 
In article 33(2), the right to social security as well as to equal compensation is referred to: 
Men and women shall have equal rights, in particular, regarding education, employment and 
promotion, and shall have the right to equal compensation for work of similar value, to social 
security, to hold offices, and to receive public honours and decorations. 
 
In article 67, the ‘right to social security’ is guaranteed for those unable to work or in material 
need, while the scope and form of this right is to be specified by statute. The right to health 
care is stipulated in article 68, while ‘special health care’ is to be provided to ‘children, 
pregnant women, handicapped people and persons of advanced age’. The Polish Constitution 
further stipulates free education in public schools and up to university level in article 70, 
while article 20 invokes the safeguarding of working conditions in that ‘[w]ork shall be 
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The post-communist Romanian Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly 
(Adunarea Constituantă) on 21 November 1991, and approved by a national referendum on 8 
December that same year. The document is without a pre-amble and codifies all the essential 
civil and political rights of citizens of the Romanian state as well as a distinct national 
identity. The 1991 Constitution formed a clear break with the totalitarian past by instituting 
the rule of law. At the same time, the 1991 Constitution can be seen as constituting continuity 
in its codification of the Romanian ethno-cultural identity and the nation as the foundation of 
the Romanian state. Because of this strong emphasis on the nation by the constitution-makers, 
I will argue that the 1991 Constitution reflects a predominance of a political culture based on 
an ‘ethic of identity’, that is, the idea that the Romanian state is primarily to protect and 
further the interests of a rather narrowly defined ethno-cultural group, the Romanian nation, 
in (partial) detriment to the interests of various national minorities as well as in tension with 
the equally codified rule of law and ‘ethic of rights’. 
 
As Cristian Preda has argued, in somewhat exaggerated terms, ‘[d]ans les faits, tout comme 
dans les discours, la transition roumaine est plus liée au passé de la nation qu’au present de la 
démocratie’ (Preda 2002: 390). The Romanian Constitution has, therefore, also been 
understood as reflecting a form of ‘constitutional nationalism’ (see Lungu 2002). 
Constitutional nationalism refers to the ‘tendency of treating the dominant ethnie in a 
privileged manner, that is formalized in the legal and constitutional framework of a society’ 
(Lungu 2002: 398). The idea of constitutional nationalism can be related to that of 
‘communitarian constitutionalism’, which considers individuals as members of a particular 
community, their goals and values shaped by such a community, and the constitution an 
expression of such shared goals and values (cf. Preuss 1995). 
 
The Romanian Constitution of 1991, even if only explicitly invocating the notion of ‘nation’ 
twice (see Preda 2002), contains numerous references to a national community. The latter is 
regarded the inheritor of the state and its sovereignty forms the foundation of the new post-
communist, democratic state. The first article, art. 1(1), articulates the idea of such a national 
community in an outspoken way: 
Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary, and indivisible National State. 
 
The article stipulates the sovereignty and independence of the post-communist Romanian 
state, which is defined as a ‘national’ state representing the Romanian nation. In principle, the 
constitution grounds state sovereignty in the 'majority ethno-nation' and not in individual 
citizens regardless of their ethnic origin. Such a definition of the nation as an ethno-cultural 
understanding of the nation, grounded in shared traditions and history, can be reconstructed 
by means of various relevant articles:  
National sovereignty resides with the Romanian people (Article 2(1)) 
No foreign populations may be displaced or colonized on the territory of the Romanian State 
(Article 2 (3)) 
The territory of Romania is inalienable (Article 3 (1)) 
The State foundation is laid on the unity of the Romanian people (Article 4(1)) 
Any defamation of the country and the nation… shall be prohibited by law (Article 30 (7)) 
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Faithfulness towards the country is sacred (Article 50) 
 
As argued, among others, by Renate Weber, these articles express a unitary, majoritarian 
vision of the Romanian nation, and its principal ethical outlook was not shared by various 
national minorities, who had reservations about consequentially reinforced tendencies towards 
assimilation by the national majority (see Weber 2001: 233-4).15 Article 50, stipulating 
‘faithfulness towards the country’, can also be found in many other constitutions, but in the 
Romanian constitution, where there is a diffused conflation of the notions ‘people’, ‘nation’, 
and ‘country’ (see Preda 2002: 393; Lungu 2002: 402), the reference to the country seems not 
necessarily as neutral as might be the case in other constitutions. 
 
Other articles are more ambiguous in that they invoke both an ‘ethic of rights’ and an ‘ethic of 
identity’ (cf. Lungu 2002). For instance, article 6(1) states that ‘The State recognizes and 
guarantees the right of persons belonging to national minorities to the preservation, 
development and expression of their ethnic, cultural and religious identity’, articulating a 
civic idea of individual, cultural rights. But, in contrast, article 6(2) immediately compromises 
such cultural rights by stating that such rights need to ‘conform to the principles of equality 
and non-discrimination in relation to the other Romanian citizens’. Cultural rights of 
minorities can, therefore, be overridden by a reference to the endangered equality of other 
citizens, notably the majority.16 Similarly, while article 16(1) codifies the equality of citizens 
before the law and public authorities, article 16(3) stipulates that ‘Access to a public office or 
dignity, civil or military, is granted to persons whose citizenship is only and exclusively 
Romanian, and whose domicile is in Romania’. 
 
The 2003 amendment of the constitution modified, but also perpetuated, a number of the 
articles relevant to constitutional nationalism and the ethic of identity. The much debated 
article 1 that states that ‘the Romanian state is a national, sovereign state, and independent, 
unitary, and indivisible’ was subjected once again to critique by the Hungarian minority. 
Once again, as in 1991, the critique of the national character of the Romanian state as an 
‘obsolete characteristic’ was dismissed in the constitutional debate, and the reference has 
remained as before (Constantinescu et al. 2004: 4). 
 
However, at the same time, a number of concessions to minority rights and participation have 
been included in the amended constitutional text. The articles 120(2) and 128(2) contain a 
significant extension of the usage of the mother tongue of minorities in interaction with public 
institutions (the public administration and judiciary institutions). In addition, article 33 on the 
right to access to culture has been introduced. This right refers to access to national culture, 
and the promotion of Romanian culture in the world (33(3)), and could in that sense be seen 
as emphasising an ethic of identity, but this right is also extended to national minorities, 
stipulating an individual right to access to culture, and therefore expanding the available set of 
rights (Constantinescu et al. 2004: 70-1). 
                                                 
15 Weber further underlines this identitarian perception of the Romanian nation – as historically and ethno-
culturally bound - by pointing to the statement of six experts of the Drafting Committee that invokes a vision of 
a ‘common ethnic origin, language, culture, religion, psychological characteristics, life, traditions, desires, and 
above all the history and aspiration to last on its territory’ (cited in Weber 2001: 235; see also Preda 2002 for the 
constitutional debate). 
16 As mentioned earlier, the majoritarian bias in the 1991 constitution was deemed unsatisfactory by some of the 
ethno-cultural groups, in particular the Hungarian minority in Transylvania (cf. Durandin 2000: 73-104), and 
contestation of the essentially unitary definition of the state informed enduring constitutional conflict in the 
1990s and early 2000s between those political parties that claim to rule in the name of the Romanian majority 
and the political party of the Hungarian minority. 
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In partial contrast to the communitarian ‘ethic of identity’ that is found in the articles 
portrayed above, the 1991 constitution extensively codified the ‘ethic of rights’ in Title II 
regarding ‘Fundamental rights, freedoms and duties’. Similarly, various articles in Title I 
employ the concept of citizenship rather than that of member of the nation: 'Romania is the 
common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any discrimination on account of 
race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property 
or social origin' (article 4 (2)). Clear-cut invocations of the ethic of rights - in the form 
codifying a Rechtsstaat, and individual civil and political rights – therefore constituting a 
strong counterweight to the predominant, exclusionary ethic of identity, can be found, among 
others, in the following articles that codify the foundational principles of the Romanian 
political community, the equality and rights of its citizens, and the acknowledgement of 
international standards: 
Romania is a democratic and social State governed by the rule of law, in which human dignity, the 
citizens’ rights and freedoms, the free development of human personality, justice and political 
pluralism represent supreme values and shall be guaranteed. (Article 1 (3)) 
Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any discrimination on 
account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, 
property or social origin. (Article 4 (2)) 
All citizens enjoy the rights and freedoms granted to them by the Constitution and other laws, and 
have the duties laid down thereby. (Article 15 (1)) 
Constitutional provisions concerning the citizens’ rights and liberties shall be interpreted and 
enforced in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the covenants and 
other treaties Romania is a party to. (Article 20 (1)) 
 
In all, what seems to emerge in the 1991 constitution is, as argued by Barbu (1999: 143), a 
dual conception of citizenship, i.e., a pre-political one that is based on ethnic identity and 
serves as the basis for popular sovereignty, and a second one, based on a political conception 
of citizenship in which all those residing on the territory enjoy distinct rights and have distinct 
obligations. 
 
As suggested above, the ethno-national dimension to citizenship in the 1991 constitution 
attenuated importantly with the extension of minority rights in the 2003 amendment as well as 
with the right to access to culture. The ethic of rights can be detected in a number of other 
modifications as well. One instance of this is the inclusion of the right of citizens with dual 
citizenship to hold public office (art. 16(3)), whereas before public office was only open to 
those with exlusive Romanian citizenship. A further instance is the inclusion of the political 
rights that come with European citizenship (for instance, the right for European citizens to 
vote and stand in local elections) (16(4)). The most clear-cut case of an explicit codification 
of the ethic of rights and the constitutional state can, however, be found in article 1(4), in 
which the implicit reference to the division of powers has been modified into an explicit 
adherence to this principle. 
 
The explicit codification of forms of direct democracy, pertaining to the ethic of participation 
or self-rule, are relatively limited in the Romanian Constitution, which includes a general and 
a number of specific references, while the execution is guarded by the Constitutional Court 
(art. 144g), but leaves the specific regulation of referenda to organic law (art. 72(3c)). 
National sovereignty resides with the Romanian people, who shall exercise it through its 
representative bodies and by referendum. (Article 2 (1)) 
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The codification of participatory rights is relatively limited in the Romanian Constitution, 
referring mostly to the conventional electoral rights (both passive and active rights) (articles 
34(1), 35(1), 35(2)) (in the 2003 Constitution: 36(1), 37(1), 37(2)), whose formulation is 
virtually the same in all post-communist constitutions (see Sadurski 2003: 38). With regard to 
the passive electoral right – the right to be elected for public office – the 1991 constitution the 
stipulated of article 16(3) according to which access to public office is only open to persons 
with Romanian citizenship and domicile, but in the 2003 amendment access to public office 
has been broadened to those with dual citizenship.  
 
Regarding constitutional amendment, the Romanian constitution is formally more 
participatory than the Hungarian one, and more far-going than the Polish possibility of a 
referendum, in that a final ratification of constitutional revisions by the public is obligatory: 
The revision shall be final after approval by a referendum held within 30 days from the date of 
passing the draft or proposal of revision. (Article 147 (3), 2003: 151(3)) 
 
Revisions are arranged for in article 146 (2003: 150) which argues that they can be initiated 
by ‘the President of Romania on the proposal of the Government, by at least one quarter of 
the number of Deputies or Senators, as well as by at least 500,000 citizens with the right to 
vote’. In contrast to the Hungarian and Polish cases, the Romanian constitution thus provides 
for civic initiatives at constitutional revision. At the same time, though, the amendment 
procedure as such is relatively rigid (according to Arato, ‘[i]ts revision rule is the most 
difficult in the region’, 2000: 163), thereby substantially reducing possibilities for effective 
public participation in constitutional politics. Not only are specific geographical-distributional 
criteria stipulated for the civic initative (art. 146(2), 2003: 150(2)), and is it difficult to 
succeed in having the revision adopted by the various constitutional actors involved and to 
arrive at final ratification, but the substance of revision is also limited. Article 148(1) 
stipulates that ‘[t]he provisions of this Constitution with regard to the national, independent, 
unitary and indivisible character of the Romanian State, the republican form of government, 
territorial integrity, independence of justice, political pluralism and official language shall not 
be subject to revision’, and ‘no revision shall be made if it results in the suppression of the 
citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms, or of the safeguards thereof’ (148(2), 2003: 
152(2)). In addition, the ‘Constitution shall not be revised during a state of siege or 
emergency, or at wartime’ (148(3), 2003: 152(3)). 
 
The constitution further allows for national referenda on ‘national problems’ on initiative of 
the president (art. 90): ‘The President of Romania may, after consultation with Parliament, 
ask the people of Romania to express, by referendum, their will on matters of national 
interest’. A referendum is also to be held in the case when the President is suspended by 
Parliament (as has occurred in May, 2007): ‘If the proposal of suspension from office has 
been approved, a referendum shall be held within 30 days, in order to remove the President 
from office’ (art. 95 (3)). Additionally, citizens are provided with the instrument of 
‘legislative initiative’, similar to the Polish case:  
A legislative initiative shall lie, as the case may be, with the Government, Deputies, Senators, or a 
number of at least 100,000 citizens entitled to vote. The citizens who exercise their right to a 
legislative initiative must belong to at least one quarter of the country's counties, while, in each of 
those counties or the Municipality of Bucharest, at least 5,000 signatures should be registered in 
support of such initiative (74(1)) 
A legislative initiative of the citizens may not touch on matters concerning taxation, international 
affairs, amnesty or pardon. (74(2)) 
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In contrast to the Hungarian and Polish constitutions, in the Romanian constitution no 
referenda are provided for on the local level (this is arranged for in organic law, as stipulated 
in art. 73(3d)). 
 
The Romanian Constitution, in a similar way as the Hungarian and Polish Constitutions, 
refers to the ethic of distributive justice by invoking a social market economy in article 1(3): 
‘Romania is a democratic and social State’. In article 43 (2003: 47), it binds the state to ‘take 
measures of economic development and social protection, of a nature to ensure a decent living 
for its citizens’ and provides a right to social security as well as to health care, comprising 
‘pensions, paid maternity leave, medical care in public health establishments, unemployment 
benefits, and other forms of social assistance, as provided by law’. Public education is to be 
provided on a free basis up until university level (article 32(1-4)). The right to work ‘cannot 
be restricted’, according to article 38 (2003: 41), while all employees have the ‘right to social 
protection of labour’, including ‘safety and hygiene of work, working conditions for women 




The argument in this paper has been that while the trajectories of democratization, and in 
particular of constitutionalization, of the new member states (exemplified by Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania) can be said to consist of a convergence towards constitutional states, 
the rule of law, and democratic pluralism, at the same time a diversification of perceptions of 
democracy and democratic political cultures can be observed in the post-1989 processes of 
constitution-making and the actual constitutional texts adopted.  
 
The constitution-making trajectories of Hungary and Poland portray a number of striking 
similarities, in particular in terms of the importance of negotiation between old regime forces 
and opposition, the weight of the latter in the construction of democracy and the drawing up 
of foundational constitutional documents, and the incremental, protracted approach towards 
constitution-making in both countries (cf. Arato 2000: 199). The case of Romania provides a 
clear contrast here, in that its revolution in 1989 was less rights-based and negotiation-
oriented, much more one-sided in the predominance of post-communist forces in the 
construction of democracy and the formulation of the constitutional text, and the constitution-
making process relatively brief, only to be reopened in 2003. 
 
The parallel democratization trajectories of Hungary and Poland have not involved, however, 
the equal predominance of distinct democratic discourses, at least if one focuses on the 
context of the constitution-making process. Constitutional politics in Hungary and Poland in 
the early 1990s took a decisively different turn, in that in Hungary there was a widespread 
consensus on legal continuity and the rule of law in constructing democracy. Conflict over 
constitutional issues seemed to focus on the political legitimacy of constituent actors and the 
political problem of majority rule (Arato 2000), although in the debates over a new 
constitution in the mid-1990s conflicts regarding the historical foundations of the Hungarian 
state became visible (Fowler 2004: 66). However, in terms of constitutional politics, only in 
the later 1990s questions of national identity and relations to the past became more prominent 
and increasingly challenged the dominant rights-based discourse (Scheppele 2000). In 
contrast, in the Polish case a profound, substantive conflict between the proponents of rights-
based visions of democracy and proponents of value-based, communitarian understandings of 
democracy emerged already early on. Here, one could perhaps detect more similarities with 
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Romanian debates, where there was a similar importance, although in this case a clear 
predominance, of value-based, communitarian understandings of democracy, which led to an 
enduring tension with national minorities, a tension not completely resolved in the 2003 
amendment. 
 
The constitutional documents reveal such diverse perceptions of democracy in there different 
emphasis on distinct democratic ethics (see for an overview, annex 1). In the Hungarian case 
there is a clear predominance of the codification of fundamental rights, the rule of law, and a 
constitutional state, while an identitarian or symbolic dimension and value-based 
understanding of democracy is conspicuously absent from the text. This does not mean, 
however, that such value-based understandings do not play any role in Hungary, as becomes 
clear from article 6(3) and the Hungarian citizenship regime, and the increasing prominence 
of the idea of a ‘counterconstitution’ since the late 1990s (Scheppele 2000). The predominant 
understanding of the democracy in Hungary is then based on the ethic of rights, but paralleled 
by a residual, potentially conflictual perception based on an ethic of identity. In the case of 
Poland, the constitutional text displays a dual, potentially tensional, understanding of 
democracy, one based on a clear invocation of an ethic of rights, a neutral state, and the rule 
of law, the other grounding democracy in an ethic of identity, i.e., a specific community, the 
Polish nation, with a specific set of values, notably Catholicism. In the Romanian constitution 
of 1991, the predominant ethic was the ethic of identity, visible in its codification of a 
national, indivisible, unitary state, ‘owned’ by the Romanian majority. Such an ethic of 
identity was, however, importantly attenuated by a reinforcement of the ethic of rights in the 
2003 amendment. 
 29 
Annex 1 - Democratic Ethics in the Constitutions of Hungary, Poland, and Romania 
 Hungary (2003) Poland (1997) Romania (2003) 
Preamble 
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ethic of identity - homeland 
God, Christianity 
sacrifice 





ethic of participation - social dialogue 
subsidiarity 
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ethic of rights democratic 
constitutional state 
(2(1)) 
fundamental rights (8 
1)) 
equality before the 
law (57) 










ruled by law (2) 
institutions function 
within limits of law 
(7) 
supreme law (8) 
international law (9) 






human dignity (30) 
limitations (31(3)) 
rule of law (1(3)) 
division of powers 
(1(4)) 
equality of citizens 
(4(2)) 





right to use mother 
tongue minorities 
(120(2), 128(2)) 
no limitation of 
fundamental rights 
(148(2)) 
ethic of identity responsibility for the 
fate of Hungarians 
living outside (6(3)) 
unitary state (3) 
assistance Poles 
living abroad (6(2)) 
ius sanguinis (34(1)) 
loyalty to the 
Republic, concern for 
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right to free access to 
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promotion culture  
world (33(3)) 
faithfulness (50) 
ethic of participation passive and active 
























local referenda (170) 
representation and 
referenda (2(1)) 
passive and active 



















ethic of distributive 
justice 
public property (9) 
right to social 
security (70E) 
physical and mental 
health (70D) 
free education (70F) 
right to work 
(70B(1)) 
right to equal to pay 
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(68) 
free education (70) 




right to social 




right to work, right to 
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